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Abstract  
Modern monetary theory (MMT) has played an important role in advancing 
understanding of the economic function of taxation, including by showing how it acts 
to “cancel” government spending as part of a spend-tax cycle. To date however, MMT 
has not fully explored the implication of these insights for how tax can also achieve 
social, economic and fiscal goals, as well as macroeconomic ones. This omission is 
addressed in this paper by suggesting that cash paid in tax is a residual figure arising 
from a plethora of decisions on tax bases, reliefs and allowances, as well as tax gaps 
that result from non-compliant taxpayer behaviour. The impact of this range of 
decisions and practices can be interpreted as a form of social policy with distributional 
and economic consequences. Such decisions and practices require systematic 
estimation and appraisal, as well as conscious management of their consequences, if 
effective control of the economy is to be maintained. It is suggested that this process 
can be supported by a modern theory of taxation (MTT) that, building on the 
understanding derived from MMT that tax is not a tool for government revenue 
maximisation, and can deliver new perspectives on the use of tax as a critical 
instrument in economic and social policy management.  
 
Key words tax, modern monetary theory, tax gaps, tax spillover, social policy, fiscal 
policy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Australian modern monetary theorist Steven Hail has suggested that “proponents of 
modern monetary theory… claim [that a] government need not balance its budget and are 
instead calling for the government to balance the economy, which they argue is a different 
thing entirely” (Hail, 2017). Paul Krugman has offered a not dissimilar view, from a critics 
perspective, suggesting that what MMT argues is that if a state has a fiat currency and only 
borrows in its own currency then they do not face debt constraints but do instead suffer an 
inflation constraint that they have to manage through the control of aggregate demand. As he 
put is “the budget deficit should be big enough to produce full employment, but not so big as 
to produce inflationary overheating” (Krugman, 2019). In summary, MMT might be suggested 
to describe a process for the management of aggregate demand within an economy with its 
own fiat currency.  
 
One of the consequent curiosities of MMT is its indifference towards describing at least some 
of the aspects of the role of tax within such an economy. It is stressed that this omission is 
partial: as several MMT authors (Mitchell et al., 2019; Wray, 2012) make clear, the 
relationship between modern monetary theory and tax is intimate in a number of areas. For 
example, it is argued that tax drives the value of money (Wray, 2012, p. 47). This is because 
it is the promise that a government makes to only accept the currency it creates in settlement 
of the tax liabilities that it issues that in turn creates demand for its currency. Currency itself 
consequently has a fiscal nature and underpinning. And as Murphy (2015) argues, if the 
proportion of anyone’s income demanded in tax within the economy is significant then there is 
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no incentive to use anything but the locally created fiat currency for the settlement of 
transactions arising within that economy: the risk of exchange gain or loss arising at the time 
of settlement of tax liabilities in that circumstance discourages anything else. The relationship 
between tax and the currency does as a result afford a government considerable control over 
its economy in that situation. In addition, the idea implicit throughout MMT that a government 
need not tax before spending, but actually must first create the money required before tax 
payment can take place has become a central insight integral to the relevance of MMT  (Bell 
1998). But despite this it is suggested that the role of tax within some aspects of MMT 
remains underdeveloped. 
 
The primary reason for this would appear to be that most discussion of tax within the context 
of MMT is primarily, and perhaps unsurprisingly given MMT’s focus on aggregate demand 
management, macroeconomic. For example, it has been argued that within MMT the primary 
role of tax is to offset demand (Fullwiler et al., 2019).  This suggestion builds on the idea that 
a government that demands more in tax than it injects into the economy through spending 
necessarily creates unemployment as a consequence (Mitchell and Mosler, 2001). Tax in this 
view has a very clear macroeconomic role.  The overall argument in relation to this has a 
longer history. Chartalism maintained that tax had a critical role in “withdrawing” money from 
circulation within the economy, and therefore assisted with the control of inflation (Lerner, 
1947). Some suggest that this insight should continue to inform MMT (Murphy, 2015). For 
others using tax to control inflation after it has broken out is an inappropriate use of its 
insights: it is instead suggested that MMT requires planning to prevent inflation occurring in 
the first place (Fullwiler et al., 2019).   
 
However viewed, this debate is macroeconomically focused. It is suggested that this is 
unfortunate in that it restricts the contribution that MMT might make to understanding the role 
of tax within an economy once the insights it has to offer are accepted because it ignores the 
crucial question of how the design of taxation systems can also serve microeconomic (or 
regulatory) and social policy objectives, as well as macroeconomic ones. There is a 
perception that proponents of MMT have not embraced this issue (Roth, 2019). For example, 
MMT’s relative indifference to taxing those with wealth (Kelton, 2019), is in part a function of 
MMT’s suggestion that redistribution can be achieved without taxation, by using government 
created credit. Such positions can obscure public understanding of the potential role of 
taxation within MMT.  
 
It is this potential role that the rest of this paper seeks to explore. In the process a number of 
issues are addressed. Firstly, it is shown that cash tax collected, which might be considered a 
balancing figure in MMT’s explanation of the funding of government spending, is a residual 
figure settled only after a whole range of decisions by government and taxpayers are taken 
into account. It is suggested that this requires that MMT consider how to manage the tax 
system as a whole if it is to fulfill its objectives, effectively requiring the creation of a modern 
taxation theory (MTT).  Secondly, the liberating effect of understanding tax as cancellation of 
money creation is considered. It is suggested that this provides the understanding on which 
MTT can be based. Thirdly, the consequence of this understanding for managing the role of 
tax within the economy is explored. The principle that taxes should not cause harm, implicit in 
recent work on tax spillovers is then explored as a characteristic of MTT before conclusions 
are drawn.  
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The limitations to MMT’s macroeconomic perception of tax 
 
As Mitchell et al. (2019, p. 333) suggest, within MMT the macroeconomic identity describing 
the monetary funding of government expenditure (G) can be summarised as follows, 
presuming T is the sum total of taxes raised in cash during a period, B is government 
borrowing and M is government created money, with ∆ representing the change in a total 
during a period: 
 
G = ∆B+ ∆M + T 
 
The concern in the context of this paper is with the interpretation of T, i.e. cash raised in 
taxes, within this equation and within wider society. The reality is that T in this formulation is a 
residual figure i.e. the tax paid in cash is only settled after a whole range of other issues have 
been addressed and their value has been assessed. So, as is noted below, T is influenced by 
decisions on the tax bases that should actually be subjected to taxation, decisions on rates 
and allowances to be provided, and taxpayer decisions on the degree to which they will be 
compliant with the demands made of them. It is not, then, the case, that a decision can be 
taken in isolation on the sum of tax to be collected: these other factors have to be taken into 
account in forecasting the sum likely to be recovered from the economy. If, as Fullwiler et al. 
(2019) argue, MMT is a tool to be used for policy formulation, and total cash tax paid plays a 
particular role in this process by assisting determination of the planned inflation rate, then this 
understanding is particularly significant: it requires a reconsideration of the significance of tax 
within MMT, and as a related issue of importance in its own right.  
 
In this context an appreciation of the tax gap is important. Both the IMF (2013) and the 
European Commission (TAXUD, 2018) argue that net tax collection arises after the deduction 
of two broadly stated tax gaps that reduce total potential gross tax yields i.e. 
 
T = Tt  -  Tf  -  Tc 
 
where Tt  is the total potential tax due on the tax base,  Tf  is the net tax foregone as a result of 
policy decisions and Tc is the tax compliance gap. Both terms require expansion. In the 
normative typology of the tax base that the IMF (2013) suggests be used for estimation of tax 
policy gaps: 
 
Tt = (Tb x Tr) 
 
where Tb is the tax base for a particular tax and Tr the standard tax rate for that tax base, and:  
 
Tf = Tp + Ts 
 
where Tp represents the value of tax bases not taxed as a  consequence of a policy decision 
(e.g. wealth) and Ts represents the value of allowances, reliefs and varying tax rates granted 
within bases that are taxed to encourage varying taxpayer behaviours by way of tax spends, 
whilst: 
 
Tc = Te + Ta + Tu 
 
where Te is the part of the tax compliance gap resulting from illegal tax evasion; Ta is the part 
resulting from the avoidance of those tax obligations that a legislature thinks fall on taxpayers 
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and Tu is the part of the tax compliance gap resulting from non-payment of tax debts, or 
unpaid taxes. 
 
Substituting this understanding in the equation for G: 
 
G = ∆B + ∆M + ((Tb x Tr)  -  Tp - Ts  -  Te  - Ta - Tu) 
 
This version of the identity previously noted suggests that the task of using tax to manage 
inflation, whether before or after it emerges into an economy in the fashion that MMT 
suggests possible is more complex than the basic identity implies. This is because what this 
identity makes clear is that the variable T – the tax settled in cash during a period - is the 
residual of a whole range of other decisions within the economy. The new identity that is 
noted implies that there are at least five tax gaps that have impact on this total: 
 
1. The tax policy gap, which refers to the cost of potential tax bases not taxed by choice 
e.g. wealth, which is untaxed in many economies; 
2. The tax spend gap, which refers to the costs (both positive and negative) of granting 
higher and lower rates of tax that vary from the norm or standard rate as well as the 
cost of all allowances and reliefs granted to taxpayers, for whatever reason; 
3. The cost of tax evasion; 
4. The cost of tax avoidance; 
5. The cost of tax bad debt i.e. declared sums owing but not actually paid.  
 
Policy is required on each of these issues to manage cash tax collected. Crucially however, 
MMT thinking has potential implications for the context in which this management should take 
place. In effect what this implies is required is a new theory of taxation that does not focus on 
cash tax collected as such, but does instead focus upon the role of tax in cancelling the credit 
created by government spending within the economy whilst simultaneously delivering the 
social and economic policies of a government that drive decision making on the tax policy and 
tax spend gaps.  
 
 
Tax as cancellation 
 
Within the context of this suggestion that a modern taxation theory might be required, one of 
MMT’s primary and most useful insights is its explanation that there is not a “tax and spend 
cycle” but a “spend and tax cycle”. This logically follows from the MMT position that all 
government spending is initially funded by a credit creation process managed by a 
government and its central bank. The importance of the logic is that this means that the 
primary role of tax is to cancel that credit (which takes the form of new money), created by 
government as a result of its spending. In this role tax plays the same role in cancelling credit, 
as bank loan repayment does with regard to commercial bank created credit (McLeay et al., 
2014). This logic, when placed within the context of the accounting identity for government 
expenditure discussed in the precious section, necessarily transforms thinking about tax. 
When tax is not required to fund government spending, which is the necessary and inevitable 
consequence of this logic, it can and should be designed to perform other pressing public 
policy roles within the economy. Other such roles can be identified (for example, these from 
Murphy, 2015): 
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1) Ratify the value of the currency by demanding payment of tax in the currency a 
government has created, thereby establishing the value of that currency for use in other 
transactions in the jurisdiction for which it is responsible; 
2) Reclaim the money a government has spent into the economy as a result of the credit 
creation it undertakes in fulfilment of its democratic mandate; 
3) Redistribute income and wealth; 
4) Reprice goods and services; 
5) Reorganise the economy i.e. to facilitate fiscal policy. 
 
To date MMT has focused almost entirely on the first and second these, yet the others are as 
potentially important. Others, such as Avi-Yonah (2011) have made the same point. The 
variation on the accounting identity noted previously also makes clear that tax has political, 
political economy and social policy implications. It is suggested that MTT should explicitly 
accept these objectives for taxation. As a result, a modern taxation theory would implicitly 
reject the orthodox economic view of taxation as a funding mechanism in which the 
microeconomic objective of revenue maximisation is paramount (as elaborated , for example, 
in IFS, 2011). Instead a more holistic view of tax that draws on the one developed by John 
Kay (1986) can usefully be adopted on the basis of, and combined with, MMT insights. In this 
conception, government is an economic agent in its own right and is a major supplier of public 
services that reallocate resources within society whilst using tax as a mechanism to facilitate 
this process.   
 
 
A broader view of tax management within the context of MMT 
 
This argument suggests that an alternative view of taxation derived from fundamental MMT 
insights can be developed. To reconcile with the MMT view of tax being a tool to assist a 
government to fulfill its mandate to manage aggregate demand within the economy a MTT 
must suggest that a government must manage its tax gaps, of the types previously noted. 
This is where common ground must be created or the macro and microeconomic objectives of 
any government cannot be reconciled.  
 
Unfortunately, few tax authorities do at present prepare tax gaps (Murphy, 2019; OECD, 
2017, p. 182). One that does so annually is the UK’s HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC 
2019b). It defines the tax gap as “the difference between the amount of tax that should, in 
theory, be collected by HMRC, against what is actually collected” (HMRC, 2016, p. 3).  The 
US’s Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) offers a variation on this when suggesting that the tax 
gap is “the difference between the tax that taxpayers should pay and what they actually pay 
on a timely basis” (IRS, 2016). Their emphasis on “timely payment” adds a nuance absent 
from the HMRC definition. Both, however, focus on the tax compliance gap (Tc in the notation 
used previously) and ignore tax forgone (Tf).  
 
In the context of both MMT, with its focus on aggregate demand, and MTT, with a focus on 
the social and economic objectives of taxation, to ignore tax foregone is a mistake: tax 
foregone is that tax that a government chooses not to collect for policy reasons. It as such 
equates to the tax policy gap, but by describing the sum as tax foregone it is made clear that 
this is a decision not to tax. The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) addresses this issue of 
tax foregone, first by suggesting that the appraisal of the tax compliance gap (Tc) has to be 
undertaken within “the current policy framework” (IMF, 2013, p. 11) and secondly by explicitly 
recognising that there is a tax foregone, or policy, tax gap arising as a result of the choices 
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made by legislators that necessarily reduces available tax revenues. They refer to this sum, 
which is referred to as tax foregone in the notation used previously, as a “policy gap”, which 
they suggest refers to tax laws granting exemptions, tax liability deferrals or preferential tax 
rates (IMF, 2013, p. 11). These decisions have substantial impact on the chances of 
achieving the goals that it is suggested should be implicit in a MTT, but at the same time so 
do they with regard to MMT’s aim of managing aggregate demand. 
 
The European Commission Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD), which publishes an 
annual study of the European Union’s VAT gap (TAXUD, 2018), also embraces this idea of a 
“tax policy gap”, noting that: 
 
“[T]he Policy Gap captures the effects of applying multiple rates and 
exemptions on the theoretical revenue that could be levied in a given VAT 
system. In other words, the Policy Gap is an indicator of the additional VAT 
revenue that a Member State could theoretically, i.e. in case of perfect tax 
compliance, generate if it applied a uniform VAT rate on all goods and 
services” (TAXUD, 2016, p. 51). 
 
It should be noted that these two international agencies apart, the significance of this gap is 
ignored and it would appear that few governments put much effort into appraising the scale of 
the cost of the tax policy gap. Again, it could be argued that the UK is an exception, but the 
data it has to offer to appraise this gap is incomplete (HMRC, 2019a). That authority’s focus is 
on the tax compliance gap (e.g. HMRC, 2019b).   
 
When considering tax compliance gaps it is apparent that there are a range of methods that 
might be used to prepare such estimates. It has been argued that all are unreliable (Gemmell 
and Hasseldine, 2013). The IMF (2013) has effectively endorsed two approaches as being of 
merit. One is described as a “top-down” approach. This uses macroeconomic data to estimate 
the potential tax base within an economy. Taking value added tax (VAT) as an example, on 
this basis the likely VAT due on each part of consumption within national income is estimated 
as if no allowances or reliefs are supplied to taxpayers (T t). Allowance is then made for the 
items exempted from charge as a result of policy decisions (Tp). In addition the cost of those 
allowances and reliefs granted either for reasons of administrative ease or to influence 
taxpayer behaviour is also estimated (Ts). These last two estimates constitute the VAT policy 
gap (Tf).  The estimated tax due net of the VAT policy gap is then compared with the actual 
yield to suggest a compliance tax gap in a “top down” approach. The compliance gap 
represents tax lost as a result of taxpayer behaviour. As the IMF have noted, an analysis of 
this sort is dependent upon the existence of statistics of sufficient quality on the size of the tax 
base derived from sources other than taxpayer records (IMF, 2017, p. 33).  
 
In contrast to this top down approach, a “bottom-up” approach uses an audit sample of 
submitted tax returns to estimate errors found within them and then extrapolates this error 
rate across the whole population of submitted returns (HMRC, 2019c, p. 4). The method does 
however leave this approach very vulnerable to estimates of tax not declared at all on tax 
returns not submitted by persons whose identity may not even be known. The methodology  
is also not good at capturing tax not paid by relatively small groups in society, such as the 
very wealthy. As Zucman et al., (2017) have noted, if such groups are predisposed to evasion 
then resulting tax gap estimates may be very vulnerable to error.  
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If MMT is to succeed in the objective of collecting specified sums in tax to ensure the 
cancellation function of tax has macroeconomic integrity, then it is apparent that those tax 
gaps need to be estimated. Moreover, they will need to be better estimated than at present, or 
the MMT objective of eliminating inflation through ex ante planning will be flawed and 
questionable. Put another way, if tax is to adequately fulfil its “cancellation function,” it will 
need to draw on tax gap estimates to come to a more precise appreciation of the extent to 
which “cancellation” is in fact taking place through current tax policy, and how future policy 
might be adjusted to better fulfil this function.  
 
There is another dimension to this management of taxation from an MMT perspective. The 
job guarantee in pursuit of full employment (Mitchell et al., 2019, p. 301ff), is partially a 
normative position. This minimally normative approach to economic policy implicit in the job 
guarantee could also be extended to other areas of taxation management to fulfil, most 
particularly the third, fourth and fifth objectives for taxation (Murphy, 2015). MMT’s description 
of  a spend and tax cycle  also opens up the possibility of tax policy being directed towards 
other social and economic objectives, while also allowing better performance of its 
macroeconomic cancellation function. 
 
Such an approach permits reframing of the way in which orthodox economics might view the 
expression of the total tax due on the tax base (Tt), noted above. In an orthodox view the 
single standard rate of tax with minimal allowances that is implicit in that formulation would be 
the optimum ordering of the tax system (see, for example, commentary by Sijbren Cnossen, 
IFS, 2011, p. 370). However, in a tax system that is not revenue maximising, and is instead 
seeking to promote social and economic policy, it follows that there would be good reason 
why tax rates would vary from the standard rate, even if it remained appropriate to indicate 
that such a rate existed. Progressive taxation will require this variation even if it challenges 
the orthodox view of efficient taxation. Likewise, some allowances and reliefs could be 
created to quite specifically induce changes in behaviour, which would again not fit a model of 
efficient taxation commonly described in orthodox economic literature (for example, Mankiw et 
al., 2009; Jorgensen and Yun, 2013). MTT will, therefore, building on the logic of MMT 
produce outcomes in tax policy quite different to those implicit in orthodox economic literature 
on this issue. Such variations in rates, reliefs and allowances will however, create the 
potential for tax spillovers, which appraise the impact one part of a tax system might have on 
the effectiveness or otherwise of other parts of the tax system of the same country in which 
they arise, or the impact that the system being considered might have on other country’s 
capacity to pursue fiscal autonomy. An awareness of tax spillovers is, then, essential in any 
system considering how MMT might achieve its taxation goals, which also means that 
reviewing them is a necessary part of MTT.  
 
 
Managing the risk within an MMT tax regime – the role of tax spillover analysis 
 
Tax spillovers were first widely discussed as a result of a seminal paper by the IMF (2014) 
that established that the corporation tax system of one country could have “spillover” effects 
on the corporate tax yield of another country. This idea has been expanded upon by Baker 
and Murphy (2019). They suggest the use of a minimally normative assumption when 
undertaking tax spillover appraisal, which assumption is that spillover appraisal should 
consider whether or not any one aspect of a tax system causes harm to the same tax in the 
same tax jurisdiction, another tax in the same jurisdiction or any aspect of tax in another 
jurisdiction. In this context causing harm means that the stated object of the tax in question 
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has been undermined. So, and to use a commonplace example, if the corporate income tax of 
a jurisdiction was to be charged at a lower rate than the personal income tax and it was 
readily possible to reassign income streams otherwise attributable to personal tax payers to 
corporations it is apparent that the corporate income tax harms the personal income tax in the 
jurisdiction in question. Such practices can hamper tax’s overall ability to perform a 
withdrawal function, as well as exacerbating wealth and income inequality.  
 
In the appraisal system that Baker and Murphy propose four taxes (personal income tax, 
corporate income tax, social security and capital gains tax as a proxy for wealth taxes) are 
appraised for their spillover consequences both on each other and against four aspects of tax 
administration, including the prevailing tax politics of the jurisdiction (which considers whether 
a climate conducive to tax compliance by taxpayers is promoted, or not); the efficiency of the 
tax administration; the efficiency of the company and trust administration and the impact of 
international agreements on each of these other aspects of the tax system.  The result is a 
multidimensional tax spillover analysis that considers both domestic and international tax 
spillover risk. The aim is to identify where that risk exists. This would appear to be of great 
significance for MMT: unless a government can predict with confidence that it can collect a 
targeted sum in tax then it follows that its ability to forecast the likely level of aggregate 
demand it can deliver within the economy without inflation arising will be severely curtailed. 
Tax spillovers undermine that prospect of forecasting accurately: tax spillover analysis 
suggests how that process can be improved. MTT extends the idea to make sure that the 
social objectives within the tax system achieve the social and economic goals noted 
previously without undermining each other.  
 
 
MMT and tax – conclusions 
 
MMT has had a substantial impact on much economic debate in recent years. Amongst its 
contributions has been the suggestion that there is not a “tax and spend cycle”, but a “spend 
and tax cycle”. This is liberating and allows for a re-conceptualisation of the role of tax within 
the economy. Rather than balancing a government’s fiscal equation, with indifference as to 
how the cash sum that achieves this goal is raised, tax can be an instrument of social, 
economic and fiscal (regulatory) policy. The idea that tax is a sum to be forecast when 
planning desired levels of inflation, as MMT considers necessary, is only possible if tax 
collected is seen as a residual of many other decisions implicit within that process. Various 
social and economic drivers of net tax owing require explicit consideration, as too do the 
various component elements of the tax gap. That consideration will extend to the requirement 
that all these sums be actively managed.  
 
If the thinking implicit within modern monetary theory is to ever underpin the economic 
strategy of a government, assessing the identified five tiers of tax gap, will be critical to its 
success in imposing control on the economy for which it has responsibility. Tax spillover 
analysis in both domestic and international arenas is also key to this process of designing tax 
systems that do not undermine themselves, while achieving social goals and simultaneously 
assisting control of aggregate demand. Any government embracing MMT will, then, need to 
adopt this methodology. Tax is key to the success or otherwise of modern monetary theory in 
practice. To date its importance has been underplayed and under appreciated. If modern 
monetary theory is to succeed therefore, it has to be paralleled by a more expansive form of 
modern taxation theory, as explained, aided by tools such as tax gap appraisal and tax 
spillover assessments. 
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